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Common agency games under adverse selection have received much attention in the last
few years.3 Contrary to standard monopolistic mechanism design problems which are
now quite well known, oligopolistic screening often leads to a complex characterization
of the equilibrium allocations. This characterization is complex for two reasons. First,
the simple version of the Revelation Principle generally used in monopolistic settings no
longer holds. To describe the whole set of equilibrium allocations of such a game, i.e., the
whole set of allocations which are implementable through a common agency game, one has
either to rely on a Delegation Principle as in Martimort and Stole (2001) or to extend in
an appropriate way the type space before using the Revelation Principle as in Epstein and
Peters (1996). Second, even in the archetypical environments analyzed by Stole (1991),
Martimort (1992, 1996), Martimort and Stole (2000) and Biais, Martimort and Rochet
(2000), the description of the equilibrium allocations is hard because it involves solving a
pair of diﬀerential equations which are not Lipschitzian at a boundary of the type spaces.
Except for the variation in competition among principals, these environments are imme-
diate extensions of those used under monopolistic screening. They involve quasi-linear
utility functions, a one-dimensional adverse selection parameter distributed continuously
on an interval with an everywhere positive density, and each principal’s strategy space
consisting of the space of continuously diﬀerentiable nonlinear schedules. The complexity
that the modeler may face in comparing the monopolistic and the oligopolistic screening
environments is thus deeply due to the nature of competition in mechanisms.
Much work in incentive theory, however, has studied simpler contracting environments
in which the type space is discrete (generally two types) and direct mechanisms are used
by the principals. The restriction to discrete type spaces can be justiﬁed by invoking the
fact that, in the real world, principals ﬁnd it of value to distinguish only a few subsets of
agents,4 and that, in the theoretical world, much of the economic intuition of self-selection
contracts can be understood with only two types. We similarly adopt this two-type
restriction in the present paper, but in the context of competitive contracting. In addition
to restricting attention to a two-type environment, we also focus on direct communication
mechanisms (i.e., contracts which are menus of no more than 2 elements). In the monopoly
setting, a restriction to direct mechanisms is not an issue because the Revelation Principle
applies and there is no loss of generality. In a common agency framework where screening
mechanisms are available to multiple principals, however, such a restriction is, a priori,
not meaningful as argued by Peters (1999) and shown with an early and abstract counter-
example by Martimort and Stole (1993). Even under oligopolistic screening, however,
3See Stole (1991) and Martimort (1992, 1996), and Martimort and Stole (2000).
4This is certainly the case for ﬁrms using nonlinear pricing since they most of the time oﬀer only a
few options to their customers.
2the restriction to direct mechanism is economically meaningful and can be justiﬁed when
menu costs impose that each principal ﬁnds it optimal to oﬀer at most a single allocation
per subset of identiﬁed agents.
Our interest in this paper is to characterize equilibrium allocations in a simple common
agency game involving two sellers and one buyer along the lines of those analyzed by
Stole (1991) and Martimort (1992, 1996) when one insists on both restrictions above: (i),
the ﬁniteness of the type space (and here we focus on the case of two possible types)
and, (ii), the set of feasible mechanisms being a priori restricted to direct mechanisms.
The motivation for this exercise is twofold. First, from a positive point of view, we
want to propose a description of common agency equilibrium in a meaningful and simple
environment. For modelers interested in applying the common agency methodology to
compare monopolistic and oligopolistic screening environments, it may be of little help to
know that a Delegation Principle or an extended version of the Revelation Principle hold in
those environments if they are not amenable to a clear description of incentive constraints,
at least a description which could be compared to that obtained under monopolistic
screening. Second, from a normative point of view, our analysis can be viewed as a
ﬁrst step towards a full characterization of equilibrium allocations in common agency
environments. Before enlarging the strategy spaces as requested by the Delegation and
the extended Revelation Principles, one may want to know what can be achieved with
mechanisms using communication spaces which have the same dimensionality than the
set of underlying types.
We start by providing the cooperative benchmark which supposes that the two prin-
cipals cooperate in their contractual oﬀers and behave as merged entity (Section 2). We
then move to the analysis of Nash equilibria of the common agency game with direct
mechanisms. Because the most appealing allocations are deterministic, we restrict our
attention to non-random direct mechanisms. Additionally, since pure-strategy equilibria
also have a natural economic appeal, we further restrict our attention to pure-strategy
equilibria and oﬀer an algorithm to compute these equilibria (Section 3). Within the
class of direct-communication, common agency games that we analyze, we ﬁnd that pure-
strategy equilibria always exist when the principals control activities of the agent which
are complements. We describe the set of those equilibria and show that under compet-
itive contracting there always exists one equilibrium of the common agency game which
replicates what can be obtained by a merged principal. However, competitive contract-
ing may also involve a signiﬁcant eﬃciency loss for some equilibria which are shown to
be asymmetric and the corresponding distortions are characterized (Section 4). In the
case of substitutes, existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium with direct mechanisms and
truth-telling always fails (Section 5). Non-existence is due to the desire of each principal
to oﬀer contracts which induce the agent to lie to the other principal. This phenomenon
3leads us to analyze more complex strategy spaces with indirect mechanisms (Section 6)
which may ensure existence. Alternatively, one may want to keep the same strategy
space for the principals but to relax the equilibrium concept. We deﬁne the concept of
quasi-equilibrium where principals are bound to oﬀer mechanisms which are collectively
incentive compatible. We show existence of such quasi-equilibria and we characterize the
corresponding allocations (Section 7).5 All proofs are in an Appendix.
2 The Model and its Benchmarks
We begin with a description of a common agency game between two sellers (principals)
selling diﬀerentiated products to a common customer. We assume that the buyer has
a quasi-linear utility function which is symmetric and concave in q1 and q2: U = −t +
u(q1,q2,θ) = −t + θ(q1 + q2) − 1
2(q2
1 + q2
2) − λq1q2, where t is a monetary transfer paid
to the principals, qi the consumption of good i, and θ the valuation for both goods. The
parameter λ ∈ (−1,1] represents the relationship between q1 and q2 in the agent’s utility
function. The two goods are complements when λ < 0 and substitutes when λ > 0.6 The
agent gets some reservation utility exogenously normalized at zero if he decides not to
consume the two goods. For simplicity, we consider the model of intrinsic common agency
in which the agent is forced to consume both goods.7 The agent’s valuation for the good
is private information, drawn form the set Θ = {θ, ¯ θ} with respective probabilities 1 − ν
and ν. Principal Pi’s proﬁt is given by Vi = ti − C(qi) when he sells quantity qi of good
i at price ti. We assume that both principals have the same constant marginal cost of
supplying the good: C(qi) = cqi for i = 1,2. For simplicity, we assume that ∆θ ≡ ¯ θ − θ
is not too large given ν, θ, λ and c, thereby guaranteeing a positive consumption for
the low type both under cooperation and competition between the sellers.8 Of course,
nothing is speciﬁc to this example and a similar framework could equally be developed to
model competition between two regulatory bodies or between two lobbying groups trying
to inﬂuence a common decision-maker.
We begin with two benchmarks for comparison: The full information contract and the
5An alternative route would be to look for mixed-strategy equilibria and prove existence using possibly
the techniques of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986). Their theorems apply when the strategy spaces are closed
subsets making them not directly useful in the case here since the set of contracts is a priori unbounded.
6When λ = 0 the two goods are unrelated. When λ = 1, the goods are perfect substitutes; i.e.,
U = t + θQ − 1
2Q2, where Q = q1 + q2.
7See Martimort and Stole (2000) for a similar model where we discuss the diﬀerence between intrinsic
and delegated common agency. In the latter case, the agent can choose to refuse one of the contract he
is oﬀered. On possible motivation for this focus on the intrinsic common agency game is that the buyer
and the sellers are all units of the same ﬁrm and that trade between those units is mandatory as it is the
case for some practices of transfer pricing within the ﬁrm.
8 A suﬃcient condition is that ν∆θ ≤ (1 − ν − λ2)(θ − c), though except for Proposition 2, this is
much stronger than necessary.
4second-best contract obtained when the principals cooperate under asymmetric informa-
tion and behave as a merged principal.





, ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Moreover, the agent gets zero rent whatever his type:
U
FB(θ) = 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Let us now move to the standard case of monopolistic screening where a merged
principal oﬀers the contract.
Proposition 1 : The collusive second-best levels of outputs are given by:
q
C(¯ θ) =















The cooperative transfers paid by each type for those quantities are given by:
t
C(¯ θ) = u(q
C(¯ θ),q






The high valuation agent gets a positive information rent:
U
C(¯ θ) = −t
C(¯ θ) + u(q
C(¯ θ),q
C(¯ θ), ¯ θ) = 2∆θq
C(θ).






This proposition is standard and well-known from the monopolistic screening literature.
Although the high valuation agent consumes an eﬃcient amount of both goods at the
optimal contract under centralized contracting, the low valuation agent’s consumption is
distorted downwards under asymmetric information. Such a distortion reduces indeed the
cost of the incentive constraint of a high valuation agent willing to mimic a low valuation
one.
53 Finding Pure-Strategy Equilibria
We now turn our attention to the analysis of the non-cooperative subgame perfect equi-
libria of the common agency contracting game.
This game unfolds as follows. First, the principals Pi (for i = 1,2) non-cooperatively
oﬀer their direct revelation mechanisms {ti(ˆ θi),qi(ˆ θi)}ˆ θi∈Θ; second, the agent accepts or
refuses both oﬀers; and third, the agent chooses within each menu by sending a private
report ˆ θi to principal Pi.
We begin by deﬁning a non-random pure-strategy equilibrium for our speciﬁc common
agency setting, which requires no restriction on the communication space between each
principal and the agent.9 Unless stated otherwise, we will use the term equilibrium to
denote this speciﬁc notion.
Deﬁnition 1 : In a non-random, pure-strategy equilibrium of the common agency game
with communication spaces Mi (i = 1,2), each principal Pi oﬀers a deterministic contract,
{ti(mi),qi(mi)}mi∈Mi, and the agent does not randomize among the messages he sends to
the principals.
Before proceeding to a systematic investigation of the pure-strategy equilibria of the
common agency game with direct communication (where Θ = Mi), we propose an algo-
rithm which helps to characterize the best-response of a principal to any pure-strategy
mechanism oﬀered by his rival.10
For any mechanism {t2(m2),q2(m2)}m2∈M2 oﬀered by P2, there is no loss of generality
in looking for P1’s best-response within the class of direct revelation mechanisms of the
form {t1(ˆ θ1),q1(ˆ θ1)}ˆ θ1∈Θ. Any payoﬀ that P1 can achieve when he oﬀers a mechanism with
some general communication space M1 can be also achieved with such a direct revelation
mechanism. Here, we simply apply the Revelation Principle for a given non-random
mechanism oﬀered by P2.11
However, diﬀerent mechanisms oﬀered by P2 may aﬀect diﬀerently the agent’s incen-
tives to misreport to P1. To capture this eﬀect mathematically, we deﬁne the agent’s





9In Section 6 we explore indirect mechanisms, for example.
10See also Martimort and Stole (2000) for a general use of this algorithm in the case of a continuum of
types.
11The argument above relies on the fact that we focus on pure-strategy equilibria between the two
principals with the agent not mixing among messages in the mechanisms he receives from either principal.
Allowing for mixed strategies alters the analysis; see footnote ?? below.
6The indirect utility function gives the value of the agent’s utility whatever his own type
and his consumption of good 1 once he has communicated an optimal message to P2 given
this type and this quantity. Moreover, for a given indirect utility function, P1’s problem is
identical to the standard principal-agent contracting problem under monopolistic screen-
ing. P2’s contract can be ignored except for its eﬀect on this indirect utility function.
The allocation {(t1(¯ θ),q1(¯ θ));(t1(θ),q1(θ))} chosen, at a best response, by P1 is solution








1(¯ q1, ¯ θ) − ¯ t1 ≥ ˆ U
1(q
1, ¯ θ) − t1 (1)
ˆ U
1(q
1,θ) − t1 ≥ ˆ U
1(¯ q1,θ) − ¯ t1 (2)
ˆ U
1(¯ q1, ¯ θ) − ¯ t1 ≥ 0 (3)
ˆ U
1(q
1,θ) − t1 ≥ 0, (4)
where ˆ U1(·) is the indirect utility function corresponding to the contract oﬀered by P2.
The ﬁrst two constraints are the incentive compatibility constraints of the high and
the low valuation agents, respectively; the last two constraints are their participation
constraints. We will use this program throughout when computing the levels of outputs
of the pure-strategy equilibria for the diﬀerent communication games we consider in this
paper.12 We already note that diﬀerent message spaces M2 correspond to possibly diﬀerent
indirect functions ˆ U1(q1,θ) and therefore to possibly diﬀerent best-responses by P1.13
For further references, it is useful to express (1) in the case of direct mechanisms. In a
pure-strategy equilibrium, the agent chooses to tell the truth to both principals. For the
high valuation agent, this means that we must have ˆ U1(¯ q1, ¯ θ)−¯ t1 = u(¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ)−¯ t1−¯ t2. The
incentive compatibility constraint (1) may thus take diﬀerent expressions depending on
P2’s oﬀer and the optimal reports that the high valuation agent makes to P2 conditionally
on lying to P1. Two possible variations of this constraint are:
−¯ t1 − ¯ t2 + u(¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ) ≥ −t1 − t2 + u(q
1,q
2, ¯ θ) (5)
12 Note that this way of proceeding is not as straightforward in the case of a mixed-strategy equilibria.
In a such case, if P2 randomizes over a distribution of mechanisms, the agent’s indirect utility function
vis ` a vis P1 becomes a random function. In a mixed-strategy equilibrium, P1 must take into account this
randomness at the time of oﬀering his own contract program, in particular including randomness into
the constraint set. In the case of random pure-strategy equilibria, our method of determining optimal
contracts is relatively unchanged: the agent’s indirect utility function will not be a random function as the
agent chooses a contract allocation before any randomness is resolved and so P1’s program is unchanged.
13For ease of notation, we will leave throughout the dependence of ˆ U1 on P2’s contract implicit.
7when ˆ U1(q
1, ¯ θ) − t1 = u(q
1,q
2, ¯ θ) − t1 − t2, (i.e., the agent lies to both principals) and
−¯ t1 + u(¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ) ≥ −t1 + u(q
1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ) (6)
when ˆ U1(q
1, ¯ θ) − t1 = u(q
1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ) − t1 − ¯ t2 (i.e., the agent lies to only P1).
Finally, still in equilibrium, ˆ U1(q
1,θ) − t1 = u(q
1,q
2,θ) − t1 − t2. Hence, the low-
valuation agent’s participation constraint (4) becomes
−t1 − t2 + u(q
1,q
2,θ) ≥ 0. (7)
4 Characterization of Pure-Strategy Direct Equilib-
ria with Complements
We now turn to the analysis of the speciﬁc case where q1 and q2 are complements in
the agent’s utility function, i.e., −1 < λ < 0. First, we characterize the set of direct
communication equilibria of the common agency game.
Proposition 2 : Assume that q1 and q2 are complements (λ ∈ (−1,0]), the cooperative
outcome can be implemented as a non-cooperative pure-strategy equilibrium of the direct
communication common agency game. There exists a set of equilibria which entail a
symmetric output allocation given by the collusive second-best levels
q
C(θ), ∀θ ∈ Θ.
In these equilibria, the principals receive transfers such that (5) and (7) are both binding.
The following constraints are also satisﬁed for the transfers oﬀered by P1:
u(q
C(θ),q
C(¯ θ), ¯ θ)−u(q
C(θ),q
C(θ), ¯ θ) < t1(¯ θ)−t1(θ) < u(q
C(¯ θ),q
C(¯ θ), ¯ θ)−u(q
C(θ),q
C(¯ θ), ¯ θ)
and a similar inequality holds for the transfers oﬀered by P2. The high and the low
valuation agent both get the same information rent as in the cooperative outcome.14
In short, even under competitive contracting, the cooperative outcome can still be
implemented. This result can be intuitively understood by returning to the deﬁnition
of the indirect utility function ˆ U1(q1,θ). When a high valuation agent chooses a high
consumption from P1 he also has an incentive to consume a large quantity from P2 since
the two goods are complements. We thus have ˆ U1(¯ q1, ¯ θ) = −¯ t2 + u(¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ). Similarly,
14Note that there will typically be a continuum of possible diﬀerent divisions of transfers for the lowest
type among the principals. We focus on those divisions which are such that each principal gets a positive
expected payoﬀ.
8when a high valuation agent chooses a low consumption from P1, he also has an incentive
to consume less from P2. This case arises when ¯ t2 − t2 is suﬃciently large so that −¯ t2 +
u(q
1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ) < −t2 + u(q
1,q
2, ¯ θ). P2 charges then a high price to the high valuation agent
so that consuming a low quantity q
1 makes him eager to also claim he has a low valuation
to P2. We have then ˆ U1(q
1, ¯ θ) = −t2 + u(q
1,q
2, ¯ θ). Writing the incentive compatibility
constraint (1) for this high valuation agent with the indirect utility function yields (5).
This global incentive compatibility constraint is exactly the same as if the principals were
cooperating and therefore, no distortion is entailed by their non-cooperative behavior.
Of course, if only this global incentive constraint is relevant, the sum of the transfers
obtained by both principals can be determined just as under centralized contracting with
a merged principal. However, the ﬂexibility in designing the individual transfers received
by each principal can be used to insure that, following a deviation, each principal realizes
that only the global incentive constraint (5) is relevant. The private incentives that each
principal faces when he wants to induce information revelation by the high valuation agent
are then aligned with the incentives of the merged principal.
There still exists a whole array of possible transfer diﬀerentials ¯ ti−ti which are consis-
tent with such an equilibrium (see Figure 1). In all those equilibria, the same symmetric
output allocation is realized.
The non-cooperative implementation of the cooperative outcome is striking and con-
trasts with the continuum-of-types analysis developed in Stole (1991) and Martimort
(1992,1996). There, it was shown that the non-cooperative behavior between the princi-
pals leads always to more ineﬃciencies than the cooperative outcome. The key diﬀerence
is that those papers assume that the agent’s valuation is continuously distributed on an
interval. With discrete types, there is always some leeway in specifying transfer diﬀeren-
tials ¯ ti − ti so that the cooperative outcome can still be implemented with competitive
contracting. This leeway disappears with a continuum of types since the slope of the
nonlinear prices that each principal oﬀers in equilibrium is then exactly pinned down by
the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint.
We now move to the analysis of ineﬃcient equilibria.
Proposition 3 : Assume that q1 and q2 are complements and that λ2 ≤ 1−ν. Then there
exists two sets S1 and S2 of ineﬃcient pure-strategy asymmetric equilibria of the direct
communication common agency game. Set 1 can be indexed by the equilibrium output
qA
1 (θ) ∈ [˜ q1(θ),qC





ν(1 − ν − λ2 − λ)










i (¯ θ) = q
FB(¯ θ) ∀i ∈ {1,2}.
In these asymmetric equilibria, the principals receive transfers such that (5), (6) and (7)





















2 (θ), ¯ θ).
The high valuation agent gets a positive information rent which is strictly smaller than at
the cooperative outcome:
U
A(¯ θ) = −t
A
1 (¯ θ) − t
A




2 (¯ θ), ¯ θ) = ∆θ(q
A
1 (θ) + q
A
2 (θ)) < U
C(¯ θ).




1 (θ) − t
A




2 (θ),θ) = 0.
Set 2 of asymmetric equilibria is obtained by permuting the roles of principals 1 and 2.
In the case where ¯ t2 − t2 is suﬃciently small, P2 charges a low marginal price to the
high valuation agent so that even if he consumes a low quantity q
1 he still claims he has
a high valuation to P2. We have then ˆ U(q
1, ¯ θ) = −¯ t2 + u(q
1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ). Writing the incentive
compatibility constraint (1) for this high valuation agent with the indirect utility function
yields therefore (6). This local incentive compatibility constraint is exactly the same as if
P1 was taking into account that P2 has independently already obtained information on
the agent. Everything happens therefore as if P1 had now to obtain information from a
coalition made of P2 and the agent.
We have represented on Figure 2, the values of the transfers in these asymmetric
equilibria.




2,θ) and (4) translates to (7), with an equality at the equilibrium.
From P1’s point of view, everything happens thus as if inducing information revelation
from the high valuation type requires leaving a payoﬀ −¯ t1+u(¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ) to the high valuation
agent which, using (6) and (7), is at least equal to u(q
1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ)−u(q
1,q
2,θ)+t2. With our
speciﬁcation of the agent’s utility function,
u(q
1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ) − u(q
1,q
2,θ) = q
1(∆θ − λ∆q2) (8)
where ∆q2 = ¯ q2 − q
2 > 0. Had the principals instead cooperated in their contract oﬀers,
inducing information revelation from the high valuation type would require leaving a
payoﬀ −¯ t1 + u(¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ) to the high valuation agent which, using (5) and (7) is least
u(q
1,q
2, ¯ θ) − u(q
1,q
2,θ) + t2 − ¯ t2. With our speciﬁcation of the agent’s utility function,
u(q
1,q





10Comparing (8) and (9), it appears clearly that reducing the output q
1 oﬀered to a low
valuation agent is more valuable in the ﬁrst case than in the second since ∆θ−λ∆q2 > ∆θ
when P2 oﬀers a monotonic contract such that ∆q2 > 0.15 As a result, P1 further reduces
the consumption of a low valuation agent below what he would do at the cooperative
contracts. By complementarity, both consumptions of the low valuation agent are in
equilibrium below the cooperative outcome.
There exists in fact a continuum of such asymmetric equilibrium quantities coming
from the fact that P1’s objective function has a kink at q1(θ). Indeed, in such an equilib-
rium, the high valuation agent is indiﬀerent between revealing or lying about his type to
P2 when he chooses to claim he has a low valuation to P1. Starting from this equilibrium
output, q1(θ), which is lower than the cooperative outcome, qC(θ), P1 does not want to
induce a further downward distortion in q
1. For these deviations, the agent prefers indeed
to claim he has also a low valuation to P2. The incentive compatibility constraint that is
satisﬁed is the global one and q1(θ) remains the best of such deviations since P1’s objective
function is concave in q
1 over the interval [0,qC(θ)]. It is also clear that P1 does not want
to distort q
1 further upward. For these deviations, the agent prefers to claim he has also
a high valuation to P2. The incentive compatibility constraint that is now satisﬁed is the
local one and a concavity argument as above shows that q1(θ) itself is the best of such
upward deviations.
Finally, it is interesting to note that asymmetric equilibria are characterized by down-
wards distortions of the productions which are comparable to those arising for all sym-
metric equilibria obtained in the case of a continuum of types.16 The economic reason
underlying those distortions is the same in both cases. Given the cooperative optimal
contract which could be oﬀered by a merged principal, the way that those transfers are
split between the two principals may be such that a principal may have an individual
incentive to deviate and oﬀer an alternative contract which induces revelation by the high
valuation agent of his type to this principal at a smaller cost from his own point of view.
This is obtained by reducing further the production oﬀered to a low valuation agent and
decreasing the payment made by this agent. By doing so, the deviating principal exerts a
negative externality on the non-deviating one who, by complementarity, must also reduce
the output oﬀered to a low valuation agent. In equilibrium, this negative externality
ﬁnally leads to an overall excessive reduction in the volume of trade. The only diﬀerence
between the discrete and the continuum cases is that, in the latter, both principals have
an incentive to deviate from the cooperative contracts and this leads to symmetric equi-
libria where both principals distort downwards the productions they oﬀer to the agent.
In the discrete case, only one of the principal has an incentive to deviate away from the
15We show in the Appendix that, in equilibrium, this monotonicity is guaranteed.
16See Sole (1991) and Martimort (1992).
11cooperative outcome and this leads to asymmetric equilibria.
5 Non-Existence of a Pure-Strategy Direct Equilib-
rium with Substitutes
With substitutes, the picture is strikingly diﬀerent.
Proposition 4 : When q1 and q2 are substitutes (i.e., λ ∈ (0,1]), there does not exist a
pure-strategy equilibrium in the direct-communication, common agency game.
The intuition for this result goes as follows: First, assume that P1 oﬀers a separating
contract. As long as this contract does not reverse the Spence-Mirrlees property of the
indirect utility of the agent vis ` a vis P2, the latter principal has an incentive to raise the
output ¯ q2 he oﬀers to a high valuation agent to make him consume little of good 1 by
claiming to P1 that he has a low valuation. P2 makes some proﬁt at the expense of P1 by
proposing such an upward deviation to the agent. Of course, P1 is willing to do the same
and there cannot be a pure-strategy equilibrium with separating contracts. Second, there
cannot be an equilibrium with both principals inducing full pooling. Indeed, suppose that
P2 oﬀers a pooling contract, then P1 would takes this oﬀer as given and would oﬀer himself
a separating allocation as we show in the Appendix. With substitutes, each principal is
thus willing to “corner” the other one and there does not exist an equilibrium in which
the principals use pure-strategies.17
Given this rather disappointing result, on may want to either extend the strategy
space available the principals or to relax the equilibrium concept to insure existence.
6 Existence with Indirect Mechanisms: An Example
The non-existence result obtained in the case of direct mechanisms contrasts sharply with
what can sometimes be done when message spaces with each principal are conveniently
extended. In particular, existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium may no longer be a
problem. To show this result, we provide an instructive counter-example. Consider the
case where the two suppliers are selling perfectly substitutes.18 We begin by describing
17Myerson (1982) has shown that a truthful equilibrium in contracts may not exist in the case of
competing hierarchies by using an abstract example which is closely related to our model.
18Importantly, note that the agent is forced to consume both goods in our context. Hence, our focus is
only on how the competition between the two suppliers shifts the cost-price margin towards zero. We do
not allow the agent to refuse to play one of the given mechanisms. This assumption may be more relevant
in a regulatory context than in a competing sellers setting but we choose to keep this interpretation to
be coherent with our earlier exposition.
12an equilibrium of an indirect communication common agency game.
Proposition 5 : When q1 and q2 are perfect substitutes (i.e., λ = 1), there exists a
pure-strategy equilibrium of the indirect communication common agency game in which
principals compete through nonlinear prices, {ti(qi)} deﬁned over the whole real line, such
that:
• each principal oﬀers a two-part tariﬀ:19
ti(qi) = cqi + ai, ∀qi
with a1 + a2 =
(θ−c)2
2 ;
• the agent always chooses the ﬁrst-best total consumption and if he splits equally his






, ∀θ ∈ Θ;
• only the high valuation agent gets a positive information rent:
U




In this equilibrium, the proﬁt of each principal is independent on the output he is
selling and represents only a fraction of the ﬁrst best surplus obtained by the low-valuation
agent. With perfect substitutes, the principals are making zero proﬁt at the margin. The
ability of the agent to choose any possible consumption bundles within the two schedules
oﬀered by the principals helps him to play one principal against the other to erode their
individual market power. As a result, the overall surplus is the same as in the ﬁrst-best.
Only the distribution of this surplus between the principals and the agent diﬀers. Indeed,
because of our assumption of intrinsic common agency, the high valuation agent can only
get a fraction of this overall surplus and the low valuation type always gets zero.
With direct mechanisms, the indirect utility function of the agent no longer exhibits
smooth behavior. As we show in the proof of Proposition 4, a small increase in the output
oﬀered through this direct mechanism by P1 to the high valuation agent may trigger a
19One word of caution is in order here. We do not restrict the principals to those two-part tariﬀs in
the ﬁrst place but obtain these at the equilibrium within the larger class of nonlinear prices.
20The agent is indiﬀerent between whom he consumes from and many other splitting of consumptions
are equilibrium outcomes. We take this particular splitting to keep the same formula as in the case of
diﬀerentiated goods.
13discontinuous change in the report made to P2 by this agent. Indeed, the high valuation
agent reduces his consumption of good 2 by a large amount. In turn, this reduction
increases P1’s proﬁt by a strictly positive amount. This discontinuity in each principal’s
payoﬀ when they consider increasing the output they oﬀer to the high valuation type
leads to the nonexistence of the pure-strategy equilibrium.
Instead, in the present example of an indirect mechanism, there are now enough out-
of-equilibrium messages contained in P2’s nonlinear price so that any small change in the
quantity consumed from P1 also triggers a small change in the consumption made from
P2. The agent’s indirect utility function becomes smooth and this smoothness ensures
the existence of the pure-strategy equilibrium.
It is striking to note that this pure-strategy equilibrium with extended communication
with both principals looks very much like a mixed-strategy equilibrium. For all transfer-
output pairs oﬀered by a principal in this equilibrium, the proﬁt made on both types is
the same.
7 Quasi-Equilibrium
Another way of obtaining existence is to relax the equilibrium concept. The non-existence
stressed above comes from the fact that, in a direct communication game with substitutes,
each principal wants the agent to lie to the other. We can avoid this problem by imposing
a priori that the set of incentive compatible pairs of contracts be collectively agreed by
the two principals. Then, each principal can only deviate within this set of collectively
incentive-compatible contracts.
Deﬁnition 2 : A pair of deterministic direct mechanisms, {ti(ˆ θi),qi(ˆ θi)}ˆ θi∈Θi for i ∈
{1,2} is collectively incentive-compatible if and only if the following incentive compatibility
constraints are always satisﬁed:
−t1(θ)−t2(θ)+u(q1(θ),q2(θ),θ) ≥ −t1(ˆ θ1)−t2(ˆ θ2)+u(q1(ˆ θ1),q2(ˆ θ2),θ) ∀(θ, ˆ θ1, ˆ θ2) ∈ Θ
3.
(10)
The diﬀerence with a purely non-cooperative approach is that each principal must
oﬀer contracts which ensures that the agent will always tell the truth not to only to him
but also to the other principal. Note that this set of collectively incentive compatible
contracts is strictly smaller than the set of contracts which would be incentive compatible
for a merged principal since, in this latter case, the agent is forced to send the same
reports to both principals and necessarily ˆ θ1 = ˆ θ2 on the right-hand-side of (10).
14Deﬁnition 3 : A pure-strategy quasi-equilibrium of the common agency game is pair of
deterministic direct mechanisms, {ti(ˆ θi),qi(ˆ θi)}ˆ θi∈Θi for i ∈ {1,2} which is collectively
incentive-compatible, such that each principal Pi is on a best response to the contract
oﬀered by the other.
Having deﬁned a quasi-equilibrium being now deﬁned, we can show its existence and
characterize the corresponding allocation in the case of substitutes.
Proposition 6 : When q1 and q2 are substitutes, there exists a unique pure-strategy



















In this quasi-equilibrium, the only binding incentive constraints are the local incentive
compatibility constraints for each principal:
u(q
Q(θ),q
Q(¯ θ), ¯ θ) − u(q
Q(θ),q
Q(θ), ¯ θ) = t
Q(¯ θ) − t
Q(θ).
In a quasi-equilibrium, everything happens, from P1’s point of view, as if the inducing
information revelation from the high valuation type requires to leave a payoﬀ −¯ t1 +
u(¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ) to the high valuation agent which, using (6) and (7), is at least equal to
u(q
1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ) − u(q
1,q
2,θ) + t2. With our speciﬁcation of the agent’s utility function,
u(q
1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ) − u(q
1,q
2,θ) = q
1(∆θ − λ∆q2) (11)
where ∆q2 = ¯ q2−q
2 > 0 and now λ > 0. Reducing the output q
1 oﬀered to a low valuation
agent is now less valuable than under cooperation since ∆θ − λ∆q2 < ∆θ when P2 oﬀers
a monotonic contract such that ∆q2 > 0. As a result, P1 increases the consumption of
a low valuation agent above what he would do at the cooperative contracts. By com-
plementarity, both consumptions of the low valuation agent are in equilibrium below the
cooperative outcome. With substitutes, each principal exerts a positive externality on the
other and in a quasi-equilibrium, the volume of trade is greater than under cooperation.
It should be stressed that this kind of distortions are exactly the same as in the case
of a continuum of types where existence is guaranteed.21
21See Stole (1991) and Martimort (1992).
15The motivation for restricting the set of feasible deviations to the set of collectively
incentive compatible contracts comes from the fact that we want to limit the the possi-
bility that either of the principals induces the agent to lie to the other. In a sense, this
restriction is a minimal one. If an equilibrium allocation with direct truthful mechanisms
exists, it must be such that the incentive constraints (10) are all satisﬁed by the equilib-
rium contracts. Otherwise, we would have a contradiction with the agent’s equilibrium
behavior. Hence, if a pure strategy equilibrium in the direct communication game exists
when each principal is allowed to deviate freely, the same equilibrium allocation should
also be obtained when each principal is restricted to deviate within a smaller set, the
set of collectively incentive compatible contracts.22 As a direct consequence of this latter
remark, we immediately get the following.
Proposition 7 : When q1 and q2 are complements, the set of pure-strategy quasi-equilibria
of the direct communication game is the same as the set of subgame perfect equilibria.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: There is no loss of generality in applying the Revela-
tion Principle as there is eﬀectively a single “merged” principal who oﬀers a contract
{(¯ t, ¯ q1, ¯ q2),(t,q
1,q
2)} which maximizes the sum of expected proﬁt subject to incentive
and participation constraints which are respectively:
−t + u(q
1,q
2,θ) ≥ −¯ t + u(¯ q1, ¯ q2,θ), (12)
−¯ t + u(¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ) ≥ −t + u(q
1,q
2, ¯ θ), (13)
−t + u(q
1,q
2,θ) ≥ 0, (14)
−¯ t + u(¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ) ≥ 0. (15)
As usual in two-type adverse selection models, (13) and (14) are the only relevant con-
straints at the optimum. The optimal relaxed cooperative contract is then solution of the
following program
max





2) + t) + ν(−c(¯ q1 + ¯ q2) + ¯ t)
subject to (13) and (14). Solving this program and taking into account that the solution of
this optimization is symmetric, we ﬁnd the results in Proposition 1. The assumption that
∆θ is suﬃciently small (see footnote 8), speciﬁcally that ν∆θ ≤ (1−ν)(θ−c), guarantees
that qC
i (θ) ≥ 0. It is easy to check that the condition qC
i (θ) > qC
i (θ) and the assumption
uθqi = 1 > 0 for i = 1,2, ensures that the omitted constraints (12) and (15) are slack at
the optimum. The expressions of the transfers and information rents immediately follow.
Proof of Propositions 2 and 3: Suppose that a pure-strategy equilibrium exists and
for each principal Pi, let (¯ qi,¯ ti) and (q
i,ti) denote the corresponding outputs and equilib-
rium transfers for respectively the high and the low valuation agent. The proof proceeds
in ﬁve steps.
Step 1: Monotonic Allocations in Equilibrium
17Lemma 1 : All pure-strategy equilibria of any communication game with complements
implement monotonic allocations of outputs: ¯ qi ≥ q
i for i = 1,2.
Proof: In any pure-strategy equilibrium, the following incentive compatibility constraints
must be satisﬁed: For the low valuation agent,
−t1 − t2 + u(q
1,q
2,θ) ≥ −¯ t1 − ¯ t2 + u(¯ q1, ¯ q2,θ), (16)
−t1 + u(q
1,q




2,θ) ≥ −¯ t2 + u(q
1, ¯ q2,θ), (18)
and for the high valuation agent
−¯ t1 − ¯ t2 + u(¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ) ≥ −t1 − t2 + u(q
1,q
2, ¯ θ), (19)
−¯ t1 + u(¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ) ≥ −t1 + u(q
1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ), (20)
−¯ t2 + u(¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ) ≥ −t2 + u(¯ q1,q
2, ¯ θ). (21)
Summing (16) and (19) implies
∆θ(∆q1 + ∆q2) ≥ 0; (22)
summing (17) and (20) implies
∆q1(∆θ − λ∆q2) ≥ 0; (23)
summing (18) and (21) implies
∆q2(∆θ − λ∆q1) ≥ 0, (24)
where we denote ∆qi ≡ ¯ qi−q
i. When λ < 0, it is easy to check that only allocations such
that ∆qi ≥ 0 satisfy (22), (23) and (24). ||
This ﬁrst Lemma is important since it now allows us to restrict the analysis to pure-
strategy equilibria with monotonically increasing allocations.
Step 2: Monotonicity of agent’s best response.
• Denote by q∗
1(θ) the output such that the agent with type θ is indiﬀerent between telling
the truth or not to P2 when he consumes a quantity q∗
1(θ) of good 1:
−¯ t2 + u(q
∗




• Deﬁne ˆ θ∗
2(q1,θ) =≡ argmaxˆ θ2∈{θ,¯ θ} −t2(ˆ θ2) + u(q1,q2(ˆ θ2),θ).
18Lemma 2 Assume that P2 oﬀers a monotonic contract such that ¯ q2 ≥ q
2, then ˆ θ∗
2(q1,θ)
is increasing in q1 and in θ, and q∗
i(θ) is decreasing in θ.
Proof: By deﬁnition we have: −t2(ˆ θ2)+u(q1,q2(ˆ θ2),θ) ≤ −t2(ˆ θ∗
2(q1,θ))+u(q1,q2(ˆ θ∗
2(q1,θ)),θ)
for any ˆ θ2 ≤ ˆ θ∗
2(q1,θ). But, since λ < 0 and q2(ˆ θ2) ≤ q2(ˆ θ∗
2(q1,θ)), we have for q0
1 > q1
−t2(ˆ θ2) + u(q
0







which ensures that ˆ θ∗
2(q0
1,θ) ≥ ˆ θ∗
2(q1,θ). Reasoning similarly holding q1 constant, increas-
ing θ and using u1θ > 0 yields that ˆ θ∗
2(·) is increasing in θ. Finally, totally diﬀerentiating
the deﬁning expression for q∗




λ < 0. ||
Step 3: Monotonicity of P1’s Best-Response Contract: We now prove that P1’s
best-response to a monotonically increasing contract oﬀered by P2 is itself monotonically
increasing:
Lemma 3 : A mechanism oﬀered by P1 which satisﬁes incentive constraints (1) and (2)
is monotonic, i.e., it satisﬁes ¯ q1 ≥ q
1.
Proof: By adding the incentive constraints, we get ∆θ ˆ U1(¯ q1,·) ≥ ∆θ ˆ U(q
1,·) where ∆θ is
the diﬀerence operator over θ (e.g., ∆θ ˆ U(q,θ) ≡ ˆ U1(q, ¯ θ) − ˆ U(q,θ)). Thus, it is suﬃcient
to show that ∆θ ˆ U1(q1,θ) is continuous and increasing in q1. Using our deﬁnition of q∗
1(θ),
there are three possible regions of q1 to consider. For q1 < q∗(¯ θ), we have ˆ θ∗
2(q1,θ) =
ˆ θ∗
2(q1, ¯ θ) = θ and therefore ∆θ ˆ U(q1,θ) = [q1 + q2(θ)]∆θ. For q1 ∈ (q∗(¯ θ),q∗
1(θ)), we have
ˆ θ∗
2(q1,θ) = θ and ˆ θ∗
2(q1, ¯ θ) = ¯ θ, and therefore ∆θ ˆ U(q1,θ) = q1[∆θ−λ∆θq2(θ)]. Finally, for
q1 > q∗(θ), we have ˆ θ∗
2(q1,θ) = ˆ θ∗
2(q1, ¯ θ) = ¯ θ and therefore ∆θ ˆ U(q1,θ) = [q1 + q2(¯ θ)]∆θ.
Within all three regions, ∆θ ˆ U1(q,θ) is continuous and increasing in q. Straightforward
algebra reveals that ∆θ ˆ U1(q,θ) is continuous at q∗
1(θ) and q∗
1(¯ θ). ||
Step 4: Output Best-Responses: Lemma 3 implies that (2) is satisﬁed whenever
(1) is binding at the optimum of P1’s program. To reduce the agent’s rent it must also
be that (4) is binding. It remains to make precise the expressions of those constraints
depending on P1’s oﬀer.
• For a consumption q
1 ≤ q∗
1(¯ θ), the incentive constraint (5) is binding and, using Lemma
2, ˆ θ∗
2(q
1,θ) = θ. After having eliminated transfers, we can rewrite P1’s program as (up to





















This yields the following best-responses: For the consumption of the high valuation agent
¯ q1 = ¯ θ − c − λ¯ q2,












1 ≡ θ − c − λq
2 − ν
1−ν∆θ.
• For a consumption q
1 ≥ q∗
1(¯ θ), the incentive constraint (6) is relevant in P1’s prob-
lem. After some manipulations, his objective function becomes (up to some constant




















After optimization of P1’s program, we obtain the following best responses:













1 ≡ θ − c − λq
2 − ν
1−ν(∆θ − λ∆q2).
Step 5: Equilibrium Conditions:
• Consider now a monotonic contract oﬀered by P2. Monotonicity implies that qL
1 ≤
q∗
1(¯ θ) ≤ qG
1 , and hence P1’s objective function attains its maximum at a kink at q∗
1(¯ θ).
Moreover, P1’s optimal contract satisﬁes −¯ t1 + u(¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ) = −t1 + u(q
1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ) because
the local incentive constraint is binding, and thus we have ˆ U2(q




2 ≤ ¯ q2, where ˆ U2 is the indirect utility function of the agent vis ` a vis P2. As
such, (5) is the relevant incentive compatibility constraint for P2 when determining his
own output best-responses. These best-responses are then given by ¯ q2 = ¯ θ −c−λ¯ q1, and
q
2 = qG
2 ≡ θ − c − λq
1 − ν
1−ν∆θ.
• In equilibrium, it is immediate to observe that we must always have ¯ q1 = ¯ q2 = qFB(¯ θ).
• An asymmetric equilibrium is obtained when q
1 = q∗
1(¯ θ) and q
2 = qG
2 . The largest and
smallest implementable values of q
1 are determined as follows. The highest sustainable
value of q
1 occurs when q
i = qG
i for i = 1,2 which is precisely the cooperative quantities,
20qC





that the resulting output schedules are monotonic. At such a point, one ﬁnds q




2 = qFB(θ)− ν
(1−ν−λ2)(1+λ)∆θ. Monotonicity is satisﬁed
whenever qFB
1 (¯ θ) − ˜ q1(θ) ≥ 0, which is equivalent to
(1−ν−λ)
(1−ν)(1−ν−λ2)∆θ ≥ 0, or more simply
1 − ν ≥ λ2. Finally, our assumption on ∆θ small guarantees that q
1 > q
2 ≥ 0.
• A symmetric equilibrium is obtained when qi(θ) < q∗
i(¯ θ) for i = 1,2. Then, it is a best
response for each principal to consider (5) as the incentive constraint binding in his own
program. The equilibrium consumptions for a low valuation agent are the same as under
cooperation between the principals.
• Lastly, we need to check that q
i ≥ 0 in the posited equilibria outcomes. The assumption
that ∆θ is suﬃciently small (see footnote 8), speciﬁcally that ν∆θ ≤ (1 − ν − λ2)(θ − c),
guarantees that, in equilibrium, q
i ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 4: The proposition proceeds in three steps.
Step 1: Nonexistence of a Separating Pure-Strategy Equilibrium: Con-
sider ﬁrst the case where this equilibrium is fully separating. In such an equilibrium,
it must be that the following holds: ˆ U1(¯ q1, ¯ θ) = u(¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ) − ¯ t2. Since q
1 < ¯ q1, we must
also have ˆ U1(q
1, ¯ θ) = u(q
1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ) − ¯ t2. From the optimality of P1’s oﬀer, (1) must be
binding and therefore: u(¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ) − ¯ t1 = u(q
1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ) − t1. Inserting this expression into
the principal’s objective function and optimizing with respect to ¯ q1 yields the ﬁrst-best
consumption for the eﬃcient agent when this maximum is given by the following ﬁrst-
order condition: ¯ q0
1 = ¯ θ − c − λ¯ q2, where q0
1 represents the optimum consistent with
the equilibrium requirement that the high-type always consumes {¯ q1, ¯ q2}. In equilib-
rium, however, the optimality of P2’s oﬀer requires also that (1) is binding and therefore:
u(¯ q0
1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ) − ¯ t2 = u(¯ q0
1,q
2, ¯ θ) − t2. Hence, any small upward deviation by P1 such that
¯ q0
1 > ¯ q1 entails ˆ U1(¯ q1, ¯ θ) = u(¯ q1,q
2, ¯ θ)−t2. The best of such deviations has still (1) binding
and therefore: u(¯ q1,q
2, ¯ θ) − t2 − ¯ t1 = u(q
1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ) − ¯ t2 − t1. Inserting this expression into
the principal’s objective function and optimizing with respect to ¯ q1 yields a contradiction.
Indeed, P1’s objective function is continuous in ¯ q1 and diﬀerentiable on the right-hand-
side of ¯ q0
1. It is easy to check that its derivative is proportional to ¯ θ − c − ¯ q1 − λq
2 which
is greater than 0 for ¯ q0
1 when P2 oﬀers a separating contract. Hence, a small upward
deviation in ¯ q1 raises his proﬁt. This gives a contradiction with the fact that ¯ q0
1 is at a
global optimum of P1’s proﬁt and that, in equilibrium, the high type consumes the high
allocation from each principal.
Step 2: Nonexistence of a Pooling Pure-Strategy Equilibrium: This is im-
mediate: If P2 oﬀers a pooling contract, P1 deviates and screens across the agent’s types.
21Step 3: Nonexistence of a Hybrid Pure-Strategy Equilibrium. Suppose that
P2 oﬀers a pooling contract, say (t2,q2), and P1 oﬀers a separating contract. In equilib-
rium, the optimality of P1’s oﬀer requires that (1) is binding and therefore: u(¯ q1,q2, ¯ θ) −
¯ t1 = u(q
1,q2, ¯ θ)−t1. It also requires that (4) is binding, i.e.: u(q
1,q2,θ)−t1 −t2 = 0. We
consider now the incentives of P2 to oﬀer such a pooling contract. First of all, P2 must
prefer this contract to a deviation in which he oﬀers (t2,q2) = (t2,q
2) and (¯ t2, ¯ q2) where
¯ q2 > q2. In this case, we have: ˆ U2(¯ q2, ¯ θ) = u(q
1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ) − t1. The best of such deviations is
obtained when (1) is binding, i.e.: u(q
1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ) − t1 − ¯ t2 = u(¯ q1,q2, ¯ θ) − ¯ t1 − t2. Inserting
the expression of the transfer into P2’s objective function and optimizing with respect to
¯ q1, a necessary condition for such a deviation not to be beneﬁcial is to have:
q2 ≥ ¯ θ − c − λq
1. (25)
However, if P2 ﬁnds optimal to oﬀer a pooling contract, it must be that (4) is binding:
u(q
1,q2,θ) − t1 − t2 = 0. Optimizing with respect to q2 yields then:
q2 = θ − c − λq
1, (26)
a contradiction with (25).
Proof of Proposition 5: Assume that P2 oﬀers a nonlinear schedule such that: t2(q2) =
cq2+a2. We can compute the indirect utility function of the agent vis ` a vis P1: ˆ U1
I(q1,θ) =




2 . Satisfying (1) and (2) imposes that: ¯ t1−c¯ q1 = t1−cq
1.
In particular, this implies that P1 is indiﬀerent between all pairs (¯ t1, ¯ q1) and (t1,q
1) since
he gets the same proﬁt on each. Let that proﬁt be denoted a1. Moreover, the partici-
pation constraints (3) is satisﬁed when (4) is binding. This yields: a1 + a2 =
(θ−c)2
2 . All
direct mechanisms which satisfy these properties can be oﬀered in a best-response of P1
to the indirect mechanism oﬀered by P2. Consider the schedule t1(q1) = cq1 + a1. This
indirect mechanism supports all possible allocations which can arise as a best-response of
P1. Hence, we have constructed an equilibrium in indirect mechanisms deﬁned over all
the real line. Furthermore, when he is given this pair of nonlinear schedules the agent
chooses the ﬁrst-best consumptions.
Proof of Propositions 6 and 7: We ﬁrst characterize the set of collectively incentive
compatible mechanisms. We focus as usual on the incentive compatibility constraints of a
high valuation agent and check ex post the incentive constraint of a low valuation agent.
The set of collectively incentive compatible contracts for ¯ θ is characterized by constraints
22(19) to (21). Similarly, The set of collectively incentive compatible contracts for θ is
characterized by constraints (16) to (18).
When λ > 0, the local incentive constraints (20) and (21) deﬁne a set of transfers
which is strictly interior to that deﬁned by the global incentive constraints (19). Indeed,
we then have:
−¯ t1 − ¯ t2 + t1 + t2 ≥ u(¯ q1,q
2, ¯ θ) − u(¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ) + u(q
1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ) − u(¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ)
> u(q
1,q
2, ¯ θ) − −u(¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ)
when ¯ qi > q
i for i ∈ {1,2}. Hence, as on Figure 3, this is the local incentive constraint
which is binding in each principal’s best response to what the other oﬀers. Neglecting the
low valuation agent’s incentive constraint which has to be checked ex post, the transfers
oﬀered by P1 are such that (20) and (7) are binding. After having eliminated transfers,

















1, ¯ q2, ¯ θ))

.
This yields the following best-responses: For the consumption of the high valuation agent
¯ q1 = ¯ θ − c − λ¯ q2,
and for the consumption of the low valuation agent
q





For a symmetric quasi-equilibrium, the outputs are ﬁnally as in Proposition (6). It is easy
to check that the low valuation agent’s incentive constraints are all slack.
23